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PUTTING THE RESTROOM DEBATE TO REST: 
ADDRESSING TITLE IX AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
IN G.G. EX REL. GRIMM V. GLOUCESTER COUNTY 
SCHOOL BOARD
Alexandra A. Harriman*
I. INTRODUCTION
Across the country, courts, legislatures, and citizens have been involved in a 
bathroom battle.  The heated debate about whether transgender students should be 
required to use the restroom that corresponds to their biological sex, or whether they 
can choose to use the facilities which align with their gender identity, was recently 
addressed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in G.G. ex
rel. Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board.1 In the first ruling of its kind, the 
Fourth Circuit interpreted the federal anti-discrimination law known as Title IX as 
requiring schools to allow transgender students access to the restrooms that fit their 
gender identity.2
Following the decision, the Obama Administration “issued guidance to the 
nation’s public schools, directing them to allow transgender students to use 
bathrooms that match their gender identity.”3 Both the Fourth Circuit’s opinion and 
the federal guidelines were met with much controversy, and the Supreme Court of 
the United States announced that it would review the G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. 
Gloucester County School Board decision.  However, upon the new presidency, 
“[o]fficials with the federal Education and Justice departments notified the U.S. 
Supreme Court . . . that the [Trump] administration . . . order[ed] the nation’s public 
schools to disregard memos the Obama Administration issued.”4 In light of this, the 
Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Fourth Circuit for consideration based 
on the Trump Administration’s revocation of the Obama Administration’s guidance.5
This is a rapidly evolving area, but the issue can be settled once and for all by a court 
adopting the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in its Title IX analysis and by going even 
                                                                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2018.  The Author would like to 
thank Professor Deirdre Smith for her guidance in writing this Note and both of her parents for their 
unending support.  The Author is especially grateful for the motivation provided by her father’s interest 
in reading not just this Note, but all of her writing over the years. 
1. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016).
2. David G. Savage, Supreme Court Asked to Weigh in on Transgender Bathroom Dispute, L.A.
TIMES (Aug. 2, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-court-transgender-students-20160802-snap-
story.html.
3. Robert Barnes & Moriah Balingit, School Board, Sued by Transgender Student, Asks for Supreme 
Court Review in Bathroom Case, WASH. POST (Aug. 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
education/school-board-sued-by-transgender-student-asks-for-supreme-court-review-in-bathroom-
case/2016/08/29/7c5c5fc4-6bc3-11e6-ba32-5a4bf5aad4fa_story.html.
4. Sandhya Somashekhar, Emma Brown & Moriah Balingit, Trump Administration Rolls Back 
Protections for Transgender Students, Wash. Post (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/education/trump-administration-rolls-back-protections-for-transgender-students/2017/02/22/550a8
3b4-f913-11e6-bf01-d47f8cf9b643_html?utm_term=.bfec25e3e552.
5. Gloucester County School Board v. G.G., SCOTUSBLOG (March 5, 2017), http://www.scotusblog
.com/case-files/cases/gloucester-county-school-board-v-g-g/.  
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further to hold that forcing students to use bathrooms that correspond with their 
biological sex is also unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. 
This Note will address the outcome of G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester County 
School Board, beginning in Part II with the legal background of an approach to a 
Title IX claim, including how courts have interpreted the same language in the 
context of a Title VII claim.  Part III will discuss the facts of G.G. and the Fourth 
Circuit’s rationale, explaining the differences between the majority and dissenting 
opinions.  Part IV will analyze the reasoning behind the Fourth’s Circuit’s Title IX 
decision and explain why it is still relevant to finding the Gloucester County School 
Board’s bathroom policy to be a violation of Title IX even after the revocation of the 
Obama Administration’s guidance.  Lastly, this Note will argue that the bathroom 
policy should also be found to be unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.  
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Title IX
Title IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex under “any education 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”6 However, the 
Department of Education’s regulations stipulate that “[a] recipient may provide 
separate toilet, locker room, and shower facilities on the basis of sex, but such 
facilities provided for students of one sex shall be comparable to such facilities 
provided for students of the other sex.”7 The issue this regulation creates is whether 
“on the basis of sex” means a student’s biological sex, or whether sex also includes 
a student’s gender identity.  To address this problem, the Obama Administration 
issued an opinion letter confirming that a policy that segregates bathrooms based on 
biological sex and without regard for students’ gender identities violates Title IX.8
Courts then struggled with whether to give the opinion letter deference, which would 
make forcing students to use the facilities that align with their biological sex a clear 
violation of Title IX, or whether to view the regulation as the controlling authority,
perpetuating the unresolved question of whether separating bathrooms “on the basis 
of sex” is permissible under Title IX. 
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the 
Supreme Court established the test for determining whether to grant deference to a 
government agency’s statutory interpretation.9 In that case, the Court explained that 
“[w]hen a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers,” 
it is confronted first with the question of “whether Congress has directly spoken to 
the precise question at issue.”10 “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of 
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress.”11 However, “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer 
is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”12 If so, the agency 
                                                                                                     
6. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012). 
7. 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 (2016).
8. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 718 (4th Cir. 2016).
9. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
10. Id. at 842.
11. Id. at 842-43.
12. Id. at 843.
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interpretation must be sustained.13 Further, an interpretation of an agency’s own 
regulations is “controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.’”14
Therefore, if Congress does not address the issue, then the agency’s 
interpretation is given deference if it is a permissible construction of the statute, 
especially when it is an interpretation of an agency’s own regulation. 
B. Title VII
The difficulties that transgender students are currently facing in schools mirror 
the past history of discrimination that transsexual employees have endured in the 
workplace.15 Because courts have already grappled with the “on the basis of sex” 
language in the employment context, case law interpreting Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 provides guidance in evaluating claims brought under Title IX.16
Title VII makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate on the basis of sex.  
Initially, courts found that the definition of “sex” should be given its “common and 
traditional interpretation” for purposes of interpreting Title VII.17 In Ulane v. 
Eastern Airlines, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
used the traditional definition of sex to hold that Title VII “means only that it is 
‘unlawful to discriminate against women because they are women and men because 
they are men.’”18 Thus, “[b]ecause the [employee] could only show that she was 
discriminated against as a transsexual, rather than as a woman or a man, the court 
concluded Title VII could provide no protection.”19
However, cases like Ulane were effectively overruled by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.  In that case, the Court held that “an 
employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that 
she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”20 As the Sixth Circuit 
acknowledged:
                                                                                                     
13. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 457 (1997).
14. Id. at 461 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)).
15. “Transgender refers to people who identify differently from their biological sex” whereas a 
“transsexual is a person who physically transitions from male to female or vice versa.” What is the 
difference between transsexual and transgender?, INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR SEXUAL MEDICINE,
http://www.issm.info/sexual-health-qa/what-is-the-difference-between-transsexual-and-transgender/ 
(last visited Dec. 5, 2016).  The situations that transsexuals have faced in the Title VII context provide an 
example of what Gavin Grimm, the plaintiff in G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board, 
has dealt with as a transgender boy.  Moreover, as a high school student, Gavin is not yet permitted to 
have sex reassignment surgery, as the Standards of Care developed by the World Professional Association 
for Transgender Health “do not permit sex reassignment surgery for persons who are under the legal age 
of majority.” G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 715 n.1 (4th Cir. 2016). 
16. See Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)) (reasoning that “when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate 
because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor ‘discriminate[s]’ on the basis of sex.’ . . . [and] the same 
rule should apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student.”).
17. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1984).
18. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Ulane, 742 F.2d at 
1085).
19. Id.
20. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).
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By holding that Title VII protected a woman who failed to conform to social 
expectations concerning how a woman should look and behave, the 
Supreme Court established that Title VII’s reference to “sex” encompasses 
both the biological differences between men and women, and gender 
discrimination, that is, discrimination based on a failure to conform to 
stereotypical gender norms.21
Thus, in the context of Title VII, gender stereotyping is prohibited as sex 
discrimination.  In fact, nearly every circuit has relied on Price Waterhouse to 
“expressly recognize a Title VII cause of action for discriminating based on an 
employee’s failure to conform to stereotypical gender norms.”22 That Title VII 
includes gender in defining sex discrimination is instructive in a Title IX claim of 
sex discrimination, because it provides an example of how to define the term “sex” 
in the context of an anti-discrimination law. 
Moreover, Title VII cases also provide guidance for interpreting agency 
guidelines.  In 1980, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)
issued guidelines specifying that sexual harassment is a form of sexual 
discrimination prohibited by Title VII.  In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Court 
reasoned that although the administrative interpretations of the Act by the enforcing 
agency were “‘not controlling upon the courts by reason of authority, [they did] 
constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants 
may properly resort for guidance.’”23 The Court subsequently concluded that “[t]he 
EEOC Guidelines fully support the view that harassment leading to noneconomic 
injury can violate Title VII.”24 Likewise, courts can properly look to administrative 
interpretations of Title IX for guidance, as they represent an informed judgment on 
the issue.
III. G.G. V. GLOUCESTER COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD
A. Factual Background
Gavin Grimm is a transgender male student at Gloucester High School.25 After 
his freshman year, Gavin informed his parents he was transgender and began seeing 
a psychologist who diagnosed him with gender dysphoria.26 As part of his treatment, 
                                                                                                     
21. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2004).
22. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1223; see Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 263-64 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (recognizing that a plaintiff alleging same-sex sexual harassment may demonstrate that the 
harassment amounted to discrimination by showing the harasser was acting to punish the victim’s 
noncompliance with gender stereotypes); Smith, 378 F.3d at 572 (finding that the plaintiff sufficiently 
pleaded claims of sex stereotyping and gender discrimination after alleging that failure to conform to sex 
stereotypes concerning how a man should look and behave was the driving force behind the defendants’ 
actions); Doe by Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 581 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated on other grounds,
523 U.S. 1001 (1998) (holding that “a man who is harassed because . . . he exhibits his masculinity in a 
way that does not meet his coworkers’ idea of how men are to appear and behave, is harassed ‘because 
of’ his sex.”).
23. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 
U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976)).
24. Id.
25. ACLU, G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board, https://www.aclu.org/cases/gg-v-gloucester-
county-school-board (last updated Oct. 28, 2016) [hereinafter ACLU].
26. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736, 739 (E.D. Vir. 2015).
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“his psychologist recommended [Gavin] begin living in accordance with his male 
gender identity in all respects . . . including with respect to his use of the restroom.”27
Gavin changed his legal name to his present masculine name, and his friends and 
family refer to him using male pronouns.28 “Additionally, when out in public, 
[Gavin] uses the boys’ restroom.”29
Further, “[a]s part of Gavin’s medical treatment for severe gender dysphoria, 
Gavin and his mother notified administrators of his male gender identity at the 
beginning of his sophomore year so that he could socially transition in all aspects of 
his life.”30 “At first, Gavin exclusively used unisex facilities in the nurse’s office, 
but found that experience to be stigmatizing and isolating.”31 Subsequently, “[w]ith 
permission from school administrators, Gavin used the boys’ restroom for almost 
two months without any incident.”32
However, in response to complaints from some parents, the School Board 
adopted a policy that limited the use of Gloucester County Public School facilities to 
the corresponding biological sexes and required that students with “sincere gender 
identity issues” be provided an “alternate private facility.”33 Using the female 
restroom was not an option for Gavin: girls and women would react negatively 
because of his masculine appearance, which would cause Gavin severe
psychological distress and would be incompatible with his treatment for gender 
dysphoria.34 Additionally, using a separate, single-stall restroom would “serve[] as 
a daily reminder that the school view[ed] him as ‘different.’”35
Consequently, Gavin sued the School Board, claiming that the Board 
“impermissibly discriminated against him in violation of Title IX of the Education 
Amendments Act of 1972 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.”36
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia did not address 
Gavin’s Equal Protection claim and granted the Board’s motion to dismiss Gavin’s 
claim under Title IX, concluding that requiring Gavin to use the female facilities did 
not impermissibly discriminate against him on the basis of sex.37 Gavin subsequently 
appealed to the Fourth Circuit.38
B. The Decision
A divided panel for the Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court, holding that 
the School Board’s policy was a violation of Title IX.39 To arrive at its decision, the 
majority relied on an opinion letter by the Obama Administration’s Department of 
Education’s Office for Civil Rights (“the Department”), which stated that “[w]hen a 
                                                                                                     
27. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. ACLU, supra note 25.
31. Letter from ACLU Found. to Educ. Opportunities Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div. 
(Dec. 18, 2014) at 2 [hereinafter Complaint Letter].
32. ACLU, supra note 25.
33. Complaint Letter, supra note 31, at 2.
34. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 716 (4th Cir. 2016).
35. Id. at 716-17.
36. Id. at 717.
37. Id.
38. 822 F.3d 709.
39. Id. at 715.
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school elects to separate or treat students differently on the basis of sex . . . a school 
generally must treat transgender students consistent with their gender identity.”40
The court determined that the Department’s regulations implementing Title IX 
contained ambiguity, and that the opinion letter resolved that ambiguity.41 Because 
the Department’s interpretation was a fair and considered judgment on the matter, 
and was not erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation or statute, the court gave it 
controlling weight.42 Thus, giving the agency interpretation deference, the court held 
that the School Board’s policy was a violation of Title IX.43
C. The Dissent
Conversely, the dissent disagreed with the majority’s holding, finding that it 
“misconstrue[d] the clear language of Title IX and its regulations.”44 Following the 
reasoning of the District Court, the dissent focused on the implementing regulations 
of the Act, which “specify that a school does not violate the Act by providing, on the 
basis of sex, separate living facilities, restrooms, locker rooms, and shower 
facilities.”45 Because the dissent further concluded that “Title IX and its 
implementing regulations [were] not ambiguous,” the dissent argued that the opinion 
letter should not be accorded deference.46 Thus, when the School Board assigned 
restrooms on the basis of biological sex, the dissent determined that “it was clearly 
complying precisely with the unambiguous language of Title IX and its 
regulations.”47
Additionally, the dissent stressed that the majority’s holding “completely 
trample[d] on all universally accepted protections of privacy and safety that are based 
on the anatomical differences between the sexes.”48 The dissent explained that 
“separating restrooms based on ‘acknowledged differences’ between the biological 
sexes serves to protect” the fundamental interest of privacy.49
Accordingly, because the dissent held that the School Board did not violate Title 
IX and its implementing regulations in adopting the policy for separate restrooms, 
the dissent “would affirm the district court’s decision dismissing [the] Title IX claim 
. . . .”50
D. Implications of the Decision
The Fourth Circuit decision on April 19, 2016, granted an injunction, which 
required the School Board to allow Gavin to again use the boys’ restroom at his 
school.  The Obama Administration’s Department of Education “cited this ruling in 
                                                                                                     
40. Id. at 718 (quoting Joint App. 55).
41. See id. at 720-21.
42. See id. at 719, 721.
43. Id. at 723.
44. Id. at 731 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 734.
46. Id. at 731.
47. Id. at 737.
48. Id. at 730.  The dissent further reasoned that, as a result of the majority’s holding, “schools would 
no longer be able to protect physiological privacy as between students of the opposite biological sex.” Id.
at 731.
49. Id. at 735 (internal citation omitted).
50. Id. at 739.
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May when it said that according to its interpretation of the federal anti-discrimination 
law known as Title IX, schools and colleges ‘must allow transgender students 
access’ to restrooms, locker rooms and dormitories that fit their ‘gender identity.’”51
That same week, the Obama Administration’s “Justice Department sued the state of 
North Carolina over its law, known as House Bill 2 or HB2.”52 HB2 defines sex as 
“the physical condition of being male or female which is stated on a person’s birth 
certificate,” and requires that schools maintain restrooms that are segregated by 
sex.53 “Since May, lawyers for Texas, Nebraska and 20 other Republican-led states 
have joined suits challenging the Education Department’s policy.”54
As a result of the Fourth Circuit ruling, Gavin was preparing to begin his senior 
year knowing he could use the restroom at school without feeling isolated.55
However, the Supreme Court issued an emergency stay on Gavin’s injunction, which 
prevented him from using the boys’ bathroom until the Court could decide whether 
to review the Fourth Circuit’s decision.56 Then, on October 28, 2016, the Supreme 
Court announced that it would hear Gavin’s case.57 Subsequently, due to the Trump 
Administration revoking the guidance that the Obama Administration issued 
regarding transgender student rights, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and 
remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit.58
IV. ANALYSIS
The Fourth Circuit decided Gavin’s Title IX claim by according deference to the 
Department’s opinion letter.  In doing so, the Fourth Circuit correctly followed the 
Supreme Court’s precedent of giving controlling weight to an agency’s interpretation 
of its own regulation.59 First, this Note argues that the Fourth Circuit correctly 
decided Gavin’s Title IX claim.  However, because the Trump Administration 
revoked the guidance that the Fourth Circuit relied on for its ruling, this Note further 
argues that the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning provides a basis for adopting the 
interpretation that the Obama Administration announced in that opinion letter.  
Second, this Note analyzes Gavin’s Equal Protection claim.  This has not yet been 
addressed by the District Court or by the Fourth Circuit.60 Nevertheless, for the 
reasons this Note provides, the School Policy is a violation of the Equal Protection 
                                                                                                     
51. Savage, supra note 2.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.; see also Gregory Korte, Judge in Texas Blocks Obama Transgender Bathroom Rules, USA
TODAY (Aug. 22, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2016/08/22/texas-judge-
temporarily-blocks-obamas-transgender-directive/89094722/ (stating that “U.S. District Judge Reed 
O’Connor’s 38-page order said federal agencies exceeded their authority under the 1972 law banning sex 
discrimination in schools.”).
55. Joshua Block, Did the Supreme Court Really Just Issue an Emergency Order to Stop a 17-Year-
Old Transgender Boy From Using the Boys Bathroom at School? ACLU (Aug. 4, 2016, 1:00 PM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/speak-freely/did-supreme-court-really-just-issue-emergency-order-stop-17-
year-old-transgender.
56. ACLU, supra note 25.
57. Id.
58. SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 5.
59. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 457 (1997).
60. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 717 n.3 (4th Cir. 2016) (declining 
to preemptively dismiss Gavin’s equal protection claim before it had been considered fully by the District 
Court).
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Clause. If an Equal Protection claim is addressed by any court, a policy that separates 
restrooms on the basis of biological sex should be held to be a violation.  The Title
IX analysis and the Equal Protection analysis will each be discussed in turn.
A. Title IX
The Fourth Circuit correctly decided Gavin’s Title IX claim for the following 
reasons.  In addressing a government agency’s interpretation of a statute, a court 
should first look at the statute in question and ask “whether Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue.”61 In this case, the statute in question is Title 
IX, which provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.”62 Congress does not address whether “on the basis of sex” means 
biological sex or whether it includes gender identity. Instead, the statute is silent 
with respect to the specific issue of how it should apply to transgender students.  
Importantly, “if the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise 
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the 
statute.”63 Rather, “the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based 
on a permissible construction of the statute.”64 If so, the Department’s approach 
must be sustained.65
Under authority from Congress, the Department of Education elucidated the 
Title IX statute by implementing the regulation 34 C.F.R. § 106.33, which allows for 
separate toilet facilities on the basis of sex as long as facilities provided for one sex 
are comparable to such facilities provided for students of the other sex.66 Under the 
Obama Administration, the Department further clarified this regulation in an opinion 
letter which stated that “‘[w]hen a school elects to separate or treat students 
differently on the basis of sex . . . a school generally must treat transgender students 
consistent with their gender identity.’”67 This interpretation did not alter the 
regulation; it simply clarified how the regulation should apply to transgender 
students. Because they were “based on best practices from schools across the 
country that have already taken up the issue,” the Obama Administration’s guidelines 
were fully considered determinations on these issues, and the protections should not 
have been withdrawn.68
When the Fourth Circuit decided Gavin’s case, the opinion letter was still in 
effect, and the majority opinion correctly gave it deference. An agency’s 
interpretation of its own regulation, even one contained in an opinion letter, is given 
controlling weight if: (1) the regulation is ambiguous; and (2) the interpretation is 
                                                                                                     
61. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
62. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
63. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
64. Id.
65. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 457 (1997).
66. 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 (2016).
67. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd, 822 F.3d 709, 718 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Joint 
App. 55).
68. Ariane de Vogue, Mary Kay Mallonee & Emanuella Grinberg, Trump Administration Withdraws 
Federal Protections for Transgender Students, CNN POLITICS (Feb. 23, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/
2017/02/22/politics/doj-withdraws-federal-protections-on-transgender-bathrooms-in-schools/.
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not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.69 Thus, analysis of whether 
the Department’s interpretation of its own regulation is accorded deference begins 
with a determination of whether the Department’s regulation contains an 
ambiguity.70 The regulation at issue, 34 C.F.R. § 106.33, allows for separate toilet 
facilities “on the basis of sex” so long as facilities provided for “students of one sex” 
are comparable to facilities provided for “students of the other sex.”71 Because the 
regulation is silent on what the phrases “students of one sex” and “students of the 
other sex” mean in the context of transgender students, the regulation is ambiguous.72
Although it could be argued that the term “sex” should be given its traditional 
interpretation of biological sex, both the Department’s interpretation, as well as case 
law in the Title VII context, include gender within the definition.  As the majority
noted, “the regulation is susceptible to more than one plausible reading because it 
permits both the Board’s reading—determining maleness or femaleness with 
reference exclusively to genitalia—and the Department’s interpretation—
determining maleness or femaleness with reference to gender identity.”73 As such, 
the Fourth Circuit was correct in ruling that the regulation is ambiguous.
After determining that the regulation is ambiguous with respect to the precise 
issue of how it applies to transgender students, the next step is to determine if the 
interpretation of the regulation in the opinion letter is plainly erroneous.  In essence, 
§ 106.33 states that schools may separate restrooms on the basis of sex.  The issue 
for transgender students like Gavin stems from the fact that the term “sex” is not 
defined.  The opinion letter issued under the Obama Administration clarifies that, in 
the context of transgender students, the term sex includes gender identity.  The 
Fourth Circuit held that “the Department’s interpretation, although perhaps not the 
intuitive one, is permitted by the varying physical, psychological, and social aspects 
. . . included in the term ‘sex.’”74 Moreover, the opinion letter is not plainly 
erroneous for two reasons.
First, the interpretation in the opinion letter is not inconsistent with the 
regulation.  The regulation is still controlling; however, when separating restroom 
facilities on the basis of sex, transgender students shall be treated consistent with 
their gender identity.  Second, including gender identity within the meaning of the 
term “sex” is consistent with Title VII claims, federal court cases, and the Justice 
and Education Departments’ stances on the issue under the Obama Administration.  
In the employment discrimination context, the term “sex” was initially given its 
common and traditional interpretation, which narrowly construed sex discrimination 
to refer only to biological differences between men and women.75 However, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins established that, in the 
context of a Title VII claim, “sex” encompasses biological differences as well as 
gender stereotypes.76 Federal courts have held that Title IX’s protection from 
discrimination based on sex includes discrimination based on gender identity or 
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transgender status.77 Similarly, the Departments of Justice and Education under the 
Obama Administration made clear that “Title IX’s sex discrimination prohibition 
extends to claims of discrimination based on gender identity . . . .”78
Therefore, because § 106.33 is ambiguous, and because the Department’s 
interpretation of its own regulation—in place at the time of the Fourth Circuit’s 
decision—was not clearly erroneous, the Fourth Circuit correctly concluded that the 
opinion letter should be given deference.  Applying appropriate deference to the 
opinion letter as the Fourth Circuit did, a policy that segregates bathrooms based on 
biological sex and without regard for students’ gender identities violates Title IX.79
Further, even with the revocation of the Department’s opinion letter, the above 
reasoning supports interpreting the regulation as the Obama Administration did.  
Without the opinion letter, the regulation is ambiguous because it is unclear how the 
term “sex” should be construed in the context of transgender students.  Interpreting 
it to encompass a student’s gender identity is not inconsistent with the regulation
because, as the Fourth Circuit noted, it is “susceptible to more than one plausible 
reading.”80 Additionally, this interpretation is not erroneous because it is consistent 
with federal court opinions and with Title VII claims defining that same term.  
Accordingly, although the Trump Administration withdrew the Obama 
Administration’s guidance, it is appropriate for any court to interpret the regulation
at issue in the same way that the Obama Administration did in its opinion letter.
Thus, when the opinion letter was still valid, the Fourth Court correctly held that 
it should be given deference.  Now that the guidance has been withdrawn, the same 
reasoning that the Fourth Circuit initially considered in Gavin’s case can still be
relevant in determining whether forcing students to use a restroom that corresponds 
with their biological sex is prohibited under Title IX.  Because the regulation 
elucidating Title IX is ambiguous, as it does not define the term “sex,” a court should 
hold that interpreting the term to include gender identity is appropriate because it is 
consistent with the definition that others have given to it, especially in the context of 
a Title VII claim. This would lead to the same result that the Obama Administration 
correctly announced in its guidance on this issue.
B. Equal Protection
Although the District Court, the Fourth Circuit, and the Supreme Court have yet 
to take on the issue, Gavin’s Equal Protection claim should be addressed.  If and 
when a court decides to rule on it, a court should find that the School Board’s policy 
is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
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The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.81
The latter part of the provision is known as the Equal Protection Clause.  In order 
to determine if there has been a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the first 
question is whether there has been a government action.82 In this case, the action is 
the enacting of the policy that required students to use the bathroom that corresponds 
with their biological sex, and the question is whether the School Board that enacted 
that policy is a governmental entity.  “As a general matter, school boards are . . . 
governmental entities.”83 Thus, because the Gloucester County School Board is a 
governmental entity, its enactment of the bathroom policy at issue is a government 
action. 
Second, it must be determined whether there was a classification, or some action 
taken by the governmental entity to single out one group from another.84 Because 
the bathroom policy specifically limits bathroom use to the corresponding biological 
sexes, transgender students are singled out because they are being forced to comply 
with a rule that requires them to use the bathroom that corresponds with their 
biological sex even though, like Gavin, these individuals may wish to use the 
bathroom that corresponds with their gender identity.  Thus, there is a classification.  
It could be argued that, because the policy classifies students on the basis of 
biological sex, and requires that each sex use separate facilities, the policy thus 
discriminates against everyone on the basis of sex and does not single out transgender 
students.  However, the policy deprives only transgender students access to the 
facilities matching their gender identity: no one else suffers that deprivation. Thus, 
that argument fails; transgender students are the only class that is treated differently 
because of the policy.85
The third issue in an Equal Protection analysis is the level of scrutiny that the 
court will apply.  First, when the governmental action involves suspect 
classifications, Equal Protection analysis requires application of strict scrutiny.86
Under strict scrutiny, the State’s interest must be compelling, and the law must be 
the least discriminatory means of achieving its goal.87 Second, under “intermediate 
scrutiny, a statutory classification must be substantially related to an important 
governmental objective.”88 Third, all other governmental actions get rational basis 
review, which asks whether “there is a rational relationship between disparity of 
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treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.”89 The Gloucester County 
School Board’s bathroom policy must be analyzed under some form of heightened 
scrutiny and not rational basis. It involves sex discrimination, which gets 
intermediate scrutiny, and the transgender students that it impacts are a suspect class, 
which triggers strict scrutiny.
Discrimination against transgender individuals is a form of sex discrimination, 
which requires intermediate scrutiny at a minimum.90 As previously discussed, in 
the context of Title VII, gender stereotyping is prohibited as sex discrimination.  The 
Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins established that sex discrimination 
encompassed social expectations concerning how a woman should look and 
behave.91 Enforcing a policy that limits bathroom use to an individual’s biological 
sex necessarily requires consideration of society’s expectation of what an individual 
of that biological sex should look like and whether an individual’s appearance 
corresponds with that expectation.  Under Price Waterhouse, that is gender 
stereotyping, which is prohibited as sex discrimination.92 This same reasoning 
applies to students in a Title IX claim and likewise extends to an Equal Protection 
claim.93 Because this is sex discrimination, it is subject to heightened scrutiny.94
Alternatively, the government action may be subject to strict scrutiny because 
“transgender discrimination bears all the indicia of a suspect classification.”95 In 
identifying whether the policy singles out a suspect class, many factors are to be 
considered, including whether the group has been subjected to discrimination,
whether the group exhibits obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that 
define them as a discrete group, and whether the group is a minority or politically 
powerless.96 A recent national survey found that “[t]ransgender students experience 
alarming rates of harassment (78%), physical assault (35%), and sexual violence 
(12%), leading one in six to drop out of school.”97 Further, gender identity is not a 
characteristic that an individual can voluntarily change or should be expected to 
change.98 Lastly, “as a tiny minority of the population, whose members are 
stigmatized for their gender non-conformity in a variety of settings, transgender 
people are a politically powerless minority group.”99 Because transgender students 
meet all the criteria for a suspect class, their classification in the School Board’s 
policy warrants strict scrutiny. 
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Regardless of whether it is subject to intermediate or strict scrutiny, the 
Gloucester County School Board’s bathroom policy fails.  In analyzing the 
government action under some form of heightened scrutiny, we must first ask if the 
policy’s classifications serve important governmental objectives.100 It is critical to 
note that what must be justified is not the exclusion of men from the women’s room 
and women from the men’s room, but rather the policy’s exclusion of transgender 
students from the facilities they previously used without any problem.101
The Gloucester County School Board stated in its policy that its goal was “to 
provide a safe learning environment for all students and to protect the privacy of all 
students.”102 Neither safety interests nor privacy interests can justify the policy’s 
discrimination against transgender students.
First, Gavin and other transgender students using the bathroom that corresponds 
with their gender identities did not present a safety concern.  As the Fourth Circuit 
noted, “the record is devoid of any evidence tending to show that [Gavin’s] use of 
the boys’ restroom creates a safety issue.”103 The court also found that “the Board 
has been, perhaps deliberately, vague as to the nature of safety concerns it has . . . 
.”104 Because there was no identifiable safety concern before the policy was enacted, 
safety is not an important justification here.
Second, while privacy may be necessary because of the inherent “physical 
differences between men and women,” physiological differences cannot trump the 
obligation to provide “genuinely equal protection.”105 The dissent suggested that 
privacy concerns in this case must be weighed strongly.106 However, the majority 
addressed those concerns, stating that “[w]e doubt that [Gavin’s] use of the 
communal restroom of his choice threatens the type of constitutional abuses present 
in the [privacy] cases cited by the dissent.”107 Thus, because there is no violation of 
privacy by allowing transgender students to use the bathroom that corresponds with 
their gender identity, privacy is not an important justification here.
Even if privacy and safety concerns were accepted as important justifications in 
this case, the policy is not substantially related to achieving those interests.  “[A] 
state cannot needlessly discriminate where a neutral option will work.”108 Here, the 
School Board is needlessly discriminating because Gavin’s bathroom use before the 
policy was enacted did not create any problems at his school.  In fact, there is now a 
greater risk for Gavin.  “The utter lack of close tailoring . . . is underscored by the 
fact that [the policy] now creates potential ‘alarm and suspicion.’”109 This is because 
Gavin has a male appearance, yet the policy forces him to use a female restroom.  
Gavin has explained that this is not a viable option for him because girls and women 
react negatively because of his masculine appearance, and this causes him severe 
psychological distress and is incompatible with his treatment for gender dysphoria.110
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Thus, rather than protecting interests of safety and privacy, it is likely that more 
problems will be created by requiring transgender students who appear as the sex 
with which they identify to use facilities designated for the opposite sex.111 “A 
classification that not only fails to serve its purported justification but, in fact, 
actively undermines it by endangering a vulnerable minority, cannot survive any 
level of constitutional review.”112
Therefore, because a governmental entity enacted a policy that discriminates 
against transgender students, which is sex discrimination and targets a suspect class, 
the policy must be reviewed under a form of heightened scrutiny. The policy’s 
justifications of safety and privacy are not sufficient here because there is no 
evidence that these concerns were implicated by allowing transgender students to 
use the bathroom that corresponds with their gender identities. Even if safety and 
privacy were important governmental objectives in enacting the policy, the policy is 
not substantially related to achieving those interests because the Board is needlessly 
discriminating and creating more problems than were present before enactment of 
the policy, while also endangering a suspect class. Because the policy fails review 
under any form of heightened scrutiny, any court addressing this issue should find 
the School Board’s policy to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
V. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit correctly accorded deference to the Department of 
Education’s opinion letter and held that the Gloucester County School Board’s 
policy separating bathrooms based on biological sex was a violation of Title IX.  
Even considering the Trump Administration’s revocation of that opinion letter, the 
Fourth Circuit’s reasoning supports adopting the interpretation that the opinion letter 
announced. Further, if a court decides to hear Gavin’s Equal Protection claim, it 
should find that forcing students to use restrooms that correspond with their 
biological sex—without consideration of students’ gender identities—is 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection clause.
  
                                                                                                     
111. See Carcaño Brief, supra note 85, at 54.
112. Id. at 45.

